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No one could accuse the American cultural industries of giving the Iraq War 
the silent treatment. Between the 24-hour news cycle and fictionalized enter-
tainment, war narratives have played a significant and evolving role in the 
media landscape since the declaration of war in 2003. Iraq War films, on the 
whole, have failed to impress audiences and critics, with notable exceptions 
like Kathryn Bigelow’s The Hurt Locker (2008), which won the Oscar for 
Best Picture, and her follow-up Zero Dark Thirty (2012), which tripled its 
budget in worldwide box office intake.1 Television, however, has fared better 
as a vehicle for profitable, war-inspired entertainment, which is perhaps best 
exemplified by the nine seasons of Fox’s 24 (2001–2010). Situated squarely 
between these two formats lies the television miniseries, combining seriality 
with the closed narrative of feature filmmaking to bring to the small screen—
and, probably more significantly, to the DVD market—a time-limited story 
that cultivates a broader and deeper narrative development than a single 
film, yet maintains a coherent thematic and creative agenda.
As a pioneer in both the miniseries format and the more nebulous category 
of quality television, HBO has taken fresh approaches to representing combat 
as it unfolds in the twenty-first century.2 These innovations build on yet also 
depart from the precedent set by Band of Brothers (2001), Steven  Spielberg’s 
WWII project that established HBO’s interest in war-themed miniseries, and 
the subsequent companion project, The Pacific (2010).3 Stylistically, both 
Band of Brothers and The Pacific depict WWII combat in ways that recall 
Spielberg’s blockbuster Saving Private Ryan (1998). Involving Spielberg and 
his DreamWorks studio also forges natural connections between  Hollywood 
cinema and HBO content—which, to be fair, has always been deeply 
entwined with the movie business thanks to a pre-series business model built 
on airing feature films for subscribing TV audiences. The channel’s turn to 
serial television with The Sopranos (1999–2007) marked a departure from 
this film-centered model, yet it remains significant that in terms of produc-
tion, HBO’s Generation Kill (hereafter GK) lacks the cinematic pedigree of 
Spielberg’s WWII miniseries.
Still, co-creators David Simon and Ed Burns were no strangers to HBO 
when they began filming GK, which they started immediately after wrap-
ping up their previous HBO series The Wire (2002–2008), a landmark of 
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recent quality TV. The success of The Wire helped win Simon the status of 
an auteur, presumed to be the most important factor in creating a show’s 
unique vision. While in film, “auteur” refers most often to the director, tele-
vision tends to treat directors as skilled craftspeople rather than creative 
lynchpins, reserving authorship status for the producer (which, significantly, 
was also Spielberg’s role for Brothers). Simon’s role as the public face of his 
television work directs the shows’ metanarrative and separates him from his 
credited co-creator Burns, thereby promoting Simon alone to the realm of 
TV auteurship.4
When GK was released, television critics seemed eager to capitalize on 
the momentum that had gathered around The Wire’s later seasons. Positive 
reviews would generally mention The Wire and its co-creators within the 
first two paragraphs, including USA Today’s suggestion that HBO’s recipe 
for future success would be to “let David Simon and Ed Burns do whatever 
they want.”5 Indeed, most critics praised the show, noting both an unusual 
resistance to romanticizing warfare and a “faithful” adaptation of Evan 
Wright’s book of the same name—although the latter point was also made 
by the series’ most fervent detractors.6
However, like many Iraq War films made for the big screen, GK never 
amassed a significant audience, prompting Variety to reiterate its endorse-
ment mid-run under the faintly incredulous headline: “Generation Kill: 
Folks, you’re really missing out.”7 Yet, even Variety’s initial review muses 
that GK’s mid-summer release indicates a lack of confidence that an Iraq 
War miniseries will attract a devoted audience, let alone win any industry 
plaudits at the distant Emmys. For his part, Simon committed to the long 
view, telling an interviewer in 2008 to “check back in about five, six years” 
to determine the real impact of GK.8 Almost on cue, in 2012 Simon told 
Salon that GK was selling twice the DVDs it had turned out four years 
earlier, crediting the power of word of mouth and, in particular, the endorse-
ment of “guys at Camp Pendleton in the Marines for two years telling their 
families, their brother, whoever else, ‘You’ve just got to see this miniseries. 
Because these guys got what we do.’”9
What the Marines do in GK is kick off the war in Iraq. The miniseries 
follows the men of First Recon Battalion from the war’s first day through 
its third week, the same unit and time frame that Wright wrote about in his 
2004 book. Wright’s fictionalized counterpart in the film (Lee Tergesen) is 
never named, but the soldiers call him “War Scribe” or “Reporter” on the 
rare occasions they engage with him. Those soldiers, poised on the front lines 
of a nascent conflict, are the beating heart of GK, with high-ranking officers 
largely absent from the action on screen. As many critics concede, it takes 
a few episodes to pick out the protagonists, but several individuals emerge 
as key players. Sgt. Brad Colbert (Alexander Skarsgård), known to his com-
rades as “Iceman,” leads the vehicle charged with protecting the Scribe, and 
Cpl. Ray Person (James Ransone) runs communications alongside him; fill-
ing out the vehicle is Lance Cpl. James Trombley (Billy Lush), who appears 
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the most eager for combat regardless of its moral dilemmas. Farther up the 
chain of command, First Lt. Nathaniel Fick (Stark Sands) distinguishes him-
self as a competent leader and a voice of reason, particularly compared to the 
overzealous Capt. Dave “Captain America” McGraw (Eric Nenninger) and 
the lunkheaded Capt. Craig “Encino Man” Schwetje (Brian Patrick Wade). 
Even First Recon’s most visible, high-ranking commander, Lt. Col. Stephen 
“Godfather” Ferrando (Chance Kelly), seems more interested in gaining favor 
with Maj. Gen. James Mattis (Robert John Burke) than in maintaining atten-
tive leadership on the ground. GK traces the battalion’s complicated political 
workings in part to comment on the problems inherent in military hierarchy, 
but also to critique the deployment of First Recon as what Iceman calls “semi-
skilled labor,” used for purposes beyond (that is, beneath) their highly specific 
training.
Instead of promoting individuation by highlighting characters one at a 
time, GK recreates the sensation of sudden immersion, leaving viewers to 
“feel the movie” rather than focus on who says what.10 Unlike Brothers, 
which carefully individuates the soldiers and their experiences (see chapter 6, 
this volume), GK tends to crowd the screen by framing the protagonists 
alongside secondary or unnamed tertiary characters in the same shot. Just 
as Wright was thrown into the dynamics of a well-established unit, viewers 
must comprehend the soldiers’ personalities over time, through repeated 
exposure rather than belabored exposition. Although this approach might 
preclude character development (a drawback noted by several critics), it 
emphasizes the shared experience of war. The sheer number of people with 
significant screen time combines with a visual style inspired by documen-
tary filmmaking to suggest an ethnographic sensibility, reinforcing the sense 
of authenticity introduced by GK’s source text—an eyewitness account 
of life on the front lines—and further supported by Simon’s background 
as a journalist. These aesthetics indicate a quiet refusal to bow to typical 
requirements for the genre and medium while underscoring Simon’s effort 
to immerse his characters in the historical reality of the Iraq War.
GK was neither the first nor the only foray into the Middle East for HBO, 
and more than most media outlets post-9/11, the channel has shown a keen 
awareness of how not to fall into the ideological trap of framing warfare as 
entertainment that supports a neoconservative agenda. Chronologically and 
ideologically, GK falls between two made-for-TV movies set during the US 
wars in Iraq and aired on HBO. Live from Baghdad (2002), based on Robert 
Wiener’s memoir, centers on CNN’s corporate cynicism and exposes how 
journalists exploited the first Gulf War. But whereas Live from  Baghdad can 
be interpreted as a self-critical interrogation of media objectivity, Taking 
Chance (2009) draws on more familiar tropes of patriotic sacrifice set 
against a disingenuously apolitical home front. Live from Baghdad show-
cases the media’s contribution to the perception of the war, while Taking 
Chance narrates a home front drama of patriotic martyrdom. What GK 
brings to HBO is the missing element in each of these TV movies: the soldiers 
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on the front lines. Not coincidentally, each of these three HBO productions 
was “based on a true story,” with Wright himself participating in the adap-
tation of his reportage for GK.
Authenticity and the Combat Genre
As a genre rooted in history, the combat film has been subjected to pointed 
criticism of its accuracy and authenticity, both of which draw upon the com-
plex notion of the “true story.” For war narratives, the notion of truth plays 
a significant role, and these texts connote truth in a variety of ways. Early 
WWII combat films incorporated documentary footage into their fictional 
stories (e.g., Sands of Iwo Jima [1949]) and often cast veterans as actors; 
GK also puts veterans on the screen, combined with a documentary-like 
characterization and cinematography that reflects the creators’ desire for 
“obsessive verisimilitude” in depicting combat.11
Drawing on eyewitness accounts as source material also conveys a desire 
to hew closely to the truth, as Spielberg did with Brothers by adapting histo-
rian Stephen E. Ambrose’s interviews with WWII veterans. The elapsed time 
between WWII and its retelling, along with the pervasiveness of preformed 
war narratives in American culture, allows legitimate skepticism to qualify 
Brothers’ claim to truth. Although Holocaust scholars have questioned the 
reliability of memory, Cathy Caruth observes that referencing trauma in 
film and television aims not to eliminate history, but rather to help others 
understand an event by resituating it onto the screen.12 Although much less 
time separates soldiers’ and journalists’ experience in Iraq from its medi-
ated adaptation, memory scholars assert that the veracity of any eyewit-
ness account remains inherently disputable. War reportage like Wright’s also 
raises the issue of reliability. Like memoirs, first-person journalism is subject 
to tension that “arises between factual truth and the discovered or imposed 
pattern of meaning.”13 Putting lived experience into writing involves selec-
tion, manipulation, and reorganization; the practice of adaptation then 
initiates the process again, with the added concern of molding the source 
material to fit the demands of a different medium.14
With any appeal to truth rendered problematic, then, the more flexible con-
cept of authenticity might better serve an analysis of how war narratives on film 
and television try to respect the ebbs and flows of lived history. What does it 
mean for a film to be authentic, to lay claim to its own veracity? Textually, GK 
connotes its authenticity through its attention to historical accuracy and in its 
commitment to televisual verisimilitude. But, perhaps most importantly, much 
of GK’s claim to authenticity comes from adaptation and auteur discourses. 
Wright’s role as a reporter invokes a certain responsibility when relating the 
facts, and the miniseries retells his “true story” through TV adaptation. Although 
Wright’s book frames the author and narrator as a single figure, the minise-
ries complicates this unified vision by delegating these roles to a team of direc-
tors, writers, and actors who relay events they never witnessed.15 By adopting 
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Wright/Scribe’s point of view, the “understanding of events could bring an audi-
ence closest to some emotional truth of the character’s experience.”16 However, 
film and television both have the power to carry multiple points of view, so 
GK shows conversations happening outside the Scribe’s purview, e.g., between 
General Mattis and Godfather. Simon’s claim that Wright’s book was his bible 
bolsters this discourse of authenticity, which is reinforced by GK’s collaborative 
authorship under Simon’s auteur brand.17 Presenting the miniseries any other 
way would have risked alienating audiences familiar with the book.
Another issue of authenticity is related to the way journalists like Wright 
reflected contemporary politics. As Stacy Takacs has noted, the media pre-
sented the first stages of the Iraq War in ways that echoed the government’s 
neoconservative attitudes.18 Although many TV series complied with the 
Bush administration’s propaganda goals, niche programming like GK 
departed from this formula by voicing doubt, making soldiers the mouth-
piece for disaffected citizens who saw the Iraq War as futile and unnecessary. 
As Takacs argues, GK’s producers made an unusually strong effort to leave 
its viewers the work of producing their own “moral judgments about the 
war.”19 Wright’s account introduced anti-propaganda messages that added 
much-needed complexity to war narratives circulating in the media; as a 
miniseries, GK sought a perspective that differed from the one championed 
by pro-government media outlets by drawing on Wright’s perceived authen-
ticity and, as discussed below, by innovating the combat genre.
These innovations must be understood alongside films depicting earlier 
wars, as the combat genre evolves within its own category over time. Jeanine 
Basinger writes, “Genre will be stronger than truth. It will use truth, take it 
in, incorporate it. This is how genre stays alive.”20 As a TV miniseries, GK 
assumes the conventions of the combat film by embracing the mélange of 
platforms implicit in the tagline: “It’s not TV. It’s HBO.” Framed by Basinger, 
the combat film has established a number of familiar conventions beyond 
the historical setting of war. Typically, a combat film features a male, mil-
itary protagonist who interacts with a socioeconomically and ethnically 
diverse group of soldiers under the eye of a commentator or observer: a 
reporter, his own or a comrade’s diary, omniscient voice-over narration, etc. 
Collectively, these soldiers experience interpersonal conflict within the unit, 
bond over their struggles, and (eventually) engage the enemy. Thematically, 
the combat film also celebrates the machismo of war, characterized by a 
precarious combination of agony and exhilaration, as well as the potential 
for cathartic sacrifice. The story is infused with concomitant references to 
military life: insignia, flags, military songs, military objectives, enemy pres-
ence, and at least one climactic, cinematic battle.21
Films about WWII draw on these conventions to build sympathy for 
Allied soldiers, even if the “good guys” are not always well intentioned or 
valorous. Vietnam films, however, often eschew a polarizing view of “good” 
and “bad,” instead establishing motifs including the “feminization of the 
enemy, the demonization of the media and the valorization of patriarchy.”22 
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These differences have brought Vietnam films into dialectical tension with 
WWII films, because the loss of soldiers’ lives in Vietnam cannot be bal-
anced by the posthumous compensation of military victory.23 As Robert 
Eberwein explains, during WWII Americans killed Nazis, while in Vietnam 
the Americans ended up killing each other, thereafter changing “the nature 
of the war film genre.” Contrary to the righteousness and purpose of WWII 
films, Vietnam films “ripped apart the union of the combat squad, and 
turned within to confront the true enemy.”24 Films about the Iraq War push 
several tendencies of Vietnam War films even further: by replacing long, real-
istic, necessarily climactic battle scenes with shorter, intermittent violence; 
by portraying local populations with compassion and including their criti-
cism of the US military operations on their soil; and by de-emphasizing the 
casualties and fatalities among US troops that WWII films use to heighten 
audiences’ emotional involvement. Whereas Basinger emphasizes that the 
resolution of a typical WWII film involves “either … victory or defeat, death 
or survival,” Iraq War films such as Redacted (2007), In the Valley of Elah 
(2007), or even American Sniper (2014) question what it means to kill civil-
ians in the name of the mission—is this defeat or victory?25
While adopting some longstanding conventions, in many respects GK 
and other visual entertainment narratives of the Iraq War underscore generic 
developments that reflect changes in how war has been fought. In GK, as in 
WWII films, a heterogeneous mix of soldiers bond as “brothers” and fight a 
telegenic battle sequence in nearly every episode. As in Vietnam films, these 
soldiers confront a problematically othered enemy under the command of 
officers whose motives and competence are increasingly called into ques-
tion. Departing from both the “good war” narratives of WWII films and 
the absurdist narratives of Vietnam War films, GK’s ideological framework 
comes from Wright and Simon’s desire to showcase the soldiers’ feelings 
about war. The miniseries also breaks with post-9/11 news media’s depic-
tion of bloodless combat, a strategy that misleadingly suggests that technol-
ogy has stripped warfare of both its inherent violence and its human costs. 
The ethos of skepticism that GK builds around the US mission challenges 
many established conventions of the war genre: most pointedly, the dual 
notion of military service as patriotic sacrifice and the character-building 
nature of combat.
Narrating Combat: Characters and Conicts
Echoing WWII-era combat film conventions, GK establishes a clear paral-
lel between the military unit and family dynamics. Basinger describes the 
“father figure” in a military narrative as “the best educated” among the 
soldiers, and he usually dies in action.26 Simon expands and explains his 
version of these parallels, naming Iceman as the “father,” Person as the 
“mother,” and Trombley as the “child”—even assigning the less conventional 
role of “weird uncle” to the reporter.27 But GK also twists this structure by 
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showing multiple father figures, yet pushing none of them to make the ulti-
mate sacrifice. In fact, these military “fathers” distinguish themselves within 
the narrative and within the military unit by overtly expressing doubt that 
this war might be worthy of such a sacrifice in the first place. Nevertheless, 
these leaders look out for their men, take responsibility for their behavior, 
and often keep their own feelings muted. One example of this is Iceman’s 
reaction to Trombley’s shooting of two Iraqi children early in the series. 
Although Iceman is stumped by Trombley’s seeming indifference to the 
incident, he does not join the unit in condemning Trombley for negligence; 
instead, Iceman reassures him that the standing order to consider all persons 
in the area as hostile will protect him from prosecution. Like an honorable 
father, Iceman assumes responsibility for the incident himself.
In the wider network of this military family, the characters also use 
humor to diffuse the tensions of combat, especially through Ray Person. 
This humor tends toward the political: The soldiers not only mock the US 
for bringing “freedom” to the oppressed—Espera often mentions the US’s 
similar “help” for Native Americans—but also criticize their own situation 
with jokes about the lack of food, lack of sex, lack of supplies, and an appar-
ent lack of common sense, as when one captain requests that soldiers mark 
a minefield at night. Similarly, the long-running series M*A*S*H (CBS, 
1972–1983) offers morbid and self-critical humor but tempers its bite by 
setting the action in Korea when the real target was clearly Vietnam.28 GK 
might not mix comedy with combat drama as comfortably as M*A*S*H, 
but its humor mordantly criticizes the framing and execution of the ongoing 
conflict. For example, in “A Burning Dog,” Ray Person admits to suggesting 
that the US entered Iraq for NAMBLA (North American Man/Boy Love 
Association) and insinuates that the soldiers are actually clearing the way 
for Starbucks.
The solidarity in GK, however congenial and familial, is forged in an 
aggressive atmosphere and shaped by commanders who clearly take plea-
sure from the fight itself. Similarly, Basinger observes that WWII combat 
films convey ambivalence about battle, showing that “war is hell” and that 
glory is never unmitigated. A film that portrays war as thrilling to watch, 
she says, “denies its own message” while “a film that says war is fun, but 
shows too much violence and death, may not deliver [the emotional relief] it 
intends.”29 GK shows combat as exhilarating, yet often reveals its purpose 
to be dubious or self-serving. In the series, Mattis overlooks Godfather’s 
mistakes and his failure to address the ineptitude and mental illness that 
Captain America inflicts on his men. Godfather’s misplaced priorities bring 
undue punishment to Lieutenant Fick, who faces sanctions after urging con-
duct that is more principled.
This problematic hierarchy and its flawed assessment of competence 
produce one of the most common conflicts in the Iraq War combat film: 
interpersonal friction among American comrades. GK sets up adversarial 
relationships between Godfather and Fick, between Fick and Encino Man, 
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and between Captain America and the unlucky men under his command. 
These conflicts inspire bonding when it comes to understanding the rules of 
engagement, standard operating procedure, and, most broadly, the execu-
tion of maneuver combat. For example, in “Screwby” Fick confronts Encino 
Man over calling in an airstrike that would endanger their own unit. When 
Encino Man misreads the grids, and Fick refrains from correcting him, the 
unit doctor (Jonah Lotan) grumbles that “for once, our asses get saved by 
sheer incompetence.” Fick’s will to speak out—or not—in order to safe-
guard the unit also earns Iceman’s trust. But their most intense adversaries 
are officers set farther up the chain; although many orders are question-
able and/or irrelevant to the work of the mission—like Major Sixta’s (Neal 
Jones) meticulous grooming standards—the soldiers find ways to address 
them so as not to seed discord in the battalion. Major Sixta finally admits 
that his attention to the soldiers’ moustaches aims to boost morale by redi-
recting dissatisfaction with the higher command toward himself (“Bomb in 
the Garden”). When the battalion can focus on the banality of shaving after 
a haphazardly planned mission, he suggests, they bond over a common, 
internal “nemesis” instead of dwelling on each other’s mistakes.30
Battleeld Contact
GK also complicates the dichotomy between the trauma and exhilaration of 
the combat experience in ways not seen in other combat films, because the 
nature of combat, redesigned for the new century, does not allow soldiers 
to “get some” in the same way they could in preceding conflicts. This “new” 
warfare started with the Gulf War (1990–1991), often labeled the first post-
modern war because it blended technological progress with unprecedented 
media saturation in alignment with the Cold War-era concept called the 
Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA).31 In 2001, the September 11 attacks 
provoked further changes, shifting the boundaries between enemy and ally, 
between civilian and military domain. In Philip E. Agre’s view, post-9/11 
nation-states at war—primarily the US—focus on damaging “enemy” 
infrastructure rather than on direct combat; technology, he continues, has 
nearly “eliminated [soldiers’] zone of professional autonomy” within the 
sphere of combat. By subjecting the men of First Recon to the orders of 
technophilic, trigger-happy superiors, GK tries to apprehend this postmod-
ern warfare.32
The RMA changed the way soldiers experienced war and how they 
understood the “imagined” (represented) war in which they could never 
participate. Men in GK seem well versed in military history, comparing their 
mistakes with those made in Vietnam or—even more tellingly—in European 
colonies, but their most tangible point of reference is their own experience 
in Afghanistan, where the RMA was also applied. Those who had tours 
of duty there show nostalgia for it, implicitly holding up Afghanistan as 
a more “legitimate” war, and certainly one better fought—that is, a war 
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with rules that were followed; a more purposeful distinction between allies 
and enemies; and a far more effective targeting of the latter (“Cradle of 
 Civilization”). Beyond the critique of the Iraq War couched in these com-
parisons, GK’s characters also show frustration about their current mission, 
which grows deeper over the course of the series. Indeed, this ability to 
build the soldiers’ dissatisfaction gradually underscores one of the advan-
tages that television offers the war narrative. An episodic structure allows 
time not only to develop multiple and complex points of view, but also to 
invite viewers to immerse themselves in the virtual world of war through 
week-to-week viewing or binge watching. Extended and/or repeated expo-
sure to the characters builds viewers’ trust in their perspective, and showing 
these soldiers’ personal evolution invites audiences to adjust their own out-
look according to the characters’ mounting disillusionment about the war, 
including the problems and effects of the RMA.
This creeping discontent, justified through cause and effect, builds a feel-
ing of failure that complicates any sense of military victory. In the beginning 
(of both the series and the war), the Marines are stoic, yet regret lingers 
on their faces when they release surrendered Iraqis under orders, already 
silently questioning the logic of their superiors’ decisions. The sense that 
the Marines have abandoned those they were sent to help magnifies their 
disillusionment, and the gaps and contradictions in military strategy become 
so glaring that the soldiers begin to speak out against them. In “A Burning 
Dog,” First Recon is ordered to drive past piles of ordnance lying in an open 
field just outside the city en route to the area’s only school, which is slated 
for detonation because the Republican Guard “took over every classroom.” 
Ray Person comments on how “weird” it is that two injured servicemen 
convinced their superiors to “level half the town” when abandoned weap-
onry provokes no such extreme reaction.
Perhaps most poignantly, the final episode “Bomb in the Garden” shows 
the troops entering Baghdad and coming face to face with the US military’s 
failures. The soldiers are forbidden to provide security to local neighbor-
hoods and cannot restore the water or electricity systems that were destroyed 
during the US bombing, constraints that Fick describes as “madness.” In the 
same episode, Iceman tries to safely detonate US bombs that have fallen, 
intact, into urban areas; he deals with one lodged in a garden where children 
would play, but Fick orders him to stop before he can detonate a second 
bomb. Iceman’s frustration only worsens after a BBC radio report describes 
kids playing on a tank who were shot by “newly arrived grunts” for “having 
a weapon”; in response, Iceman declares, “We keep killing civilians, we’re 
gonna waste this fucking victory.” Ever the professional soldier, Iceman still 
follows orders, but this episode delivers frank criticism from the miniseries’ 
most sympathetic characters, emphatically underscoring the poor planning 
that brings them, at best, a pyrrhic victory.
The most compelling and frequently recurring evidence of combat mis-
takes in GK comes in its portrayal of death, a burden the series shows to 
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be borne almost exclusively by non-combatants.33 This marks a complete 
departure from connoting death as either patriotic sacrifice, a framing prev-
alent in WWII combat films, or as punishment for involvement, as seen in 
Vietnam War films. For the soldiers in GK, death is omnipresent yet kept at 
arm’s length, entering their orbit when they kill Iraqis—“enemy” and civil-
ian alike—or when they hear about Marine casualties with no attachment to 
First Recon. The Iraqi bodies that appear in nearly every episode highlight 
America’s gruesome failure to “win hearts and minds,” as the series focuses 
more intently on civilian casualties than on insurgents killed in action. This 
stark imbalance points to the strategic shortcomings of US policy, and the 
lack of fatalities in First Recon denies characters and viewers alike the 
catharsis that accompanies an American death in other war films. Death 
in GK aims not to convey heroism to fallen soldiers, but rather the full 
apprehension of the meaning of “collateral damage.” Allied deaths in WWII 
combat films are presumed to serve the good of society, but American deaths 
in GK, which occur rarely and never among the protagonists, are treated 
with indignation among the troops, as they clash with their superiors over 
decisions that they find irrational.
The purpose of death in the WWII film thus marks a sharp contrast with 
the pointlessness that GK ascribes to the casualties in Iraq, whether suffered 
by US forces or by civilians guilty only of being in the wrong place at the 
wrong time. From the beginning, the soldiers of First Recon grapple with an 
inability to absorb these casualties into a coherent narrative, as illustrated 
in Iceman’s comment about “wasting” the victory. The soldiers pass civilian 
corpses on the roads, mistakenly kill children and women, and repeatedly 
witness their superiors’ glaring incompetence, like ordering an airstrike on 
empty desert. Although most of the main characters are keenly aware that 
US forces are inflicting unnecessary damage on the Iraqi people, GK shows 
that tensions run high for any combat situation, no matter how hastily or 
carelessly ordered, even though each incident further inures them to the act 
of killing.
The gory display of Iraqi corpses in GK draws attention to how American 
forces outmatch the insurgents in training and technology. The Allied and 
Axis powers in WWII had comparably trained soldiers and access to similar 
technologies; in Vietnam, the US had technological superiority but lacked 
its opponents’ knowledge of the territory; in Iraq, the US had superior tech-
nology, training, and tactical information while Iraqi insurgents fought with 
improvised weapons and little to no training. These imbalances demonstrate 
the RMA’s conception of battlefields that contrast First World technology 
with outmoded, Third World warfare. The RMA foresaw a short-operational 
victory, and as Takacs notes, only in these terms did it succeed; the RMA 
failed to create a long-term strategy to finish the conflict.34 Without a plan 
to bring closure to the war, the drawn-out US military presence alienated 
and angered the Iraqis, obscuring the ultimate goal of bringing broader 
peace to the region.
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In GK, the failure of the RMA to prevent collateral damage takes a heavy 
toll on the soldiers’ morale and on the US goal to win “hearts and minds,” 
compounding the traumatic experiences discussed above. The soldiers see 
tough combat in every episode, nearly all of it dogged by fatal or near-fatal 
mistakes: In “A Burning Dog” the Recon soldiers observe a calm Iraqi vil-
lage with kids playing in the garden and women cooking then witness its 
annihilation after an erroneously ordered airstrike (Figure 15.1).
After watching the destruction, Iceman can only stutter that they can-
not know what their superiors saw, but they must have found something 
to justify the attack. The war, pitched as necessary and preventative, thus 
 
Figure 15.1  Generation Kill highlights the military’s failure to prevent collateral 
damage in the Iraq War and its consequent wearing down of the 
soldiers’ morale. In one example, members of First Recon witness the 
annihilation of an Iraqi household that they had determined harmless.
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transforms before viewers’ eyes into a war of provocation. Beyond battles 
with insurgents, the soldiers raid villages, homes, and schools, killing inno-
cent civilians and transforming the war zone into a no-man’s-land, open to 
criminals who disregard the laws of war.
The Iraqis are not the only ones under surveillance in GK; as Agre 
observes, the US soldiers have no “zone of professional autonomy,” as every 
decision about where to move and whom to shoot is discussed beforehand 
with their superiors.35 Unlike WWII and Vietnam films, in which soldiers 
have little to no contact with the officers who organize the battle, GK shows 
soldiers in Iraq as under near-constant supervision. Leaders like Godfather 
operate at a remove from their soldiers and engage in combat not for stra-
tegic gain but for the thrill of combat itself. For example, in “A Burning 
Dog” the battalion is ordered to cross a bridge where the insurgents have 
set up an ambush. Forced down the most dangerous road, in darkness, 
the soldiers continue under the lights of Cobra helicopters to drive over 
a  booby-trapped bridge. These orders introduce a parallel between Iraqi 
civilians and US combat troops, both of whom are subject to the power of 
distant but violent others. In a war where air strikes can replace almost any 
direct combat situation, commanders still push their soldiers into unneces-
sary engagements, forcing confrontation for its own sake, regardless of its 
target or effects.
Media Presence in Combat
By portraying combat during an ongoing conflict, GK also connects to 
contemporary, non-fictional representations of the Iraq War, even con-
tributing to the heated debate over the war’s effectiveness that involved 
Americans at the home front. Unlike GK, Brothers and Pacific take a nos-
talgic perspective on the notion of WWII as a “good war” and reiterate 
established conventions of the WWII film. GK, on the other hand, takes 
a more ironic stance toward the combat genre by showing how its estab-
lished assumptions are poorly suited to the reality of postmodern warfare. 
GK thus illustrates how the new mode of engagement has unmoored itself 
from the generic expectations established by combat films based on pre-
vious wars.
The role of the media in the soldiers’ lives marks yet another aspect of 
warfare in the new century. Technology allows journalists to share images 
of war almost instantaneously with soldiers, civilians, and other journalists, 
leading to the immersion and entrapment of soldiers within images of war. 
Observing photographs of the World Trade Center collapse and prisoner 
abuse at Abu Ghraib, Jean Baudrillard contends that war now takes place 
virtually; it is, for example, in a photo of an American soldier forcing an 
Iraqi to sodomize a pig that true violence exists, for these images neutralize 
conflict just as pornography neutralizes sex.36 These photographs not only 
become viral, leading to one side “extinguishing” the other through such 
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images, but they also amass their own power to reduce the fact of the event 
to mere spectacle.
Baudrillard claims that it is no longer important whether these war images 
are false or true; rather, it is the way images are immersed in the war that 
measures their impact, making events synonymous with their pictures and 
turning them into a parody of violence, a reality show that is in fact “a des-
perate simulacrum of power.”37 He also claims that “embedded” journalists, 
like Wright, are no longer necessary; the soldiers themselves can circulate 
their own imagery. GK acknowledges that soldiers now narrate their own 
war experience by adding a concluding scene, without precedent in Wright’s 
book, in which the unit gathers together to watch a video montage they created. 
As Baudrillard describes, while watching their own video, the soldiers observe 
how their virtual identities have become of a piece with the dead bodies, the 
explosions, the battered landscapes. In the beginning, the soldiers perceive 
these images as exultant and triumphant, similar to the scene in Jarhead (2005) 
when Marines cheer at an attack on a Vietnamese village in Apocalypse Now 
(1979). Anthony Swofford, ex-Marine and author of the Gulf War memoir 
from which Sam Mendes’ film was adapted, has discussed the perception of 
“anti-war” Vietnam films as exhilarating rather than appalling, emphasizing 
that, for a young man thirsty for combat, these films cannot avoid becom-
ing pro-war.38 In GK, however, the accumulation of these images shifts the 
Marines’ perspective, and one by one, the soldiers of First Recon stop egging 
on their virtual selves, then turn and walk away from the screen in silent 
acknowledgment of the bitterness that comes with this experience of war. By 
the end, the only soldier left is Trombley, for whom these images are “fucking 
beautiful.” As Takacs notes, Trombley’s vocal, visible approval leaves viewers 
with the notion that men like  Trombley would most probably be responsible 
for the next, doomed phase of the already botched war.39
In Baudrillard’s words, “those who live by the spectacle will die by 
the spectacle”—meaning a figurative death for most, but the relationship 
between soldiers and the media reveals different implications.40 Although 
post-9/11 news coverage tended to assume a pro-military perspective, 
with time the media began to turn its back on the war. The soldiers in GK 
seem quite aware of the American media’s duplicity, treating the BBC as 
 trustworthy—in “Get Some,” someone claims that even Godfather gets war 
news from the BBC—while dismissing CNN in “Cradle of Civilization” as 
purveyors of “drama” lacking any useful information.
Perhaps the postmodern news media—that is, media outlets invested in 
the simulacrum of war—will soon be disregarded when it comes to Iraq. 
As historian Michael Anderegg once said of Vietnam, “cinematic represen-
tations seem to have supplanted even so-called factual analyses as the dis-
course of the war, as the place where some kind of reckoning will need to 
be made and tested.”41 The potential for entertainment television like GK 
to assert historical knowledge is already here, reflecting a postmodern ten-
dency to render history indistinguishable from its representations, even in 
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conflicts whose conclusions and repercussions have yet to play out. These 
events, after all, need distance to be assessed as history, so that, in Simon’s 
words, citizens can become “more fully aware of what it means to engage 
in modern state-sponsored warfare.”42 But cloaking war discourse in the 
guise of entertainment brings with it the risk that “the conversion of war, 
especially specific wars, can escape recuperation in America as long as war 
and militarism remain such deeply ingrained features of social life.”43 The 
Iraq War combat genre is relatively young, yet it presents the potential to 
avoid both romanticizing warfare and generating celebratory “war porn.”
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